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The Meaning of Marriage: State Efforts 
to Facilitate Friendship, Love,                      
and Childrearing 
RICHARD ARNESON* 
What business does the government have in sticking its nose into 
people’s private affairs?  What affairs could be more legitimately private 
than relationships involving sex and love? 
I.  LOCKEAN LIBERTARIANISM 
These questions resonate with many individuals across a wide range 
of ideologies and beliefs.  For many of us these questions will strike us 
as rhetorical questions to which the obvious answers are “none” and 
“none.”  These responses reflect a Lockean libertarian strain in the social 
thinking of many intelligent and thoughtful people. 
Of course matters are more complex, even as viewed from a Lockean 
libertarian perspective.1  Sex and love tend to bring about new children, 
and causing a child to exist is a social act with wide consequences for 
other people who could not be supposed to consent to bear these 
consequences.  Libertarians will regard with equanimity the showering 
 
 *  Professor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego. I thank Connie 
Rosati, who commented on this paper at a conference at the University of San Diego 
School of Law, for shrewd suggestions and insights. 
 1. For the canonical statement of Lockean libertarianism, see ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 10 (1974).  For John Locke’s views, see JOHN LOCKE, 
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (J.W. Gough ed., Basil, Blackwell & Mort Ltd. 
1966) (1690); also consider A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS (1992) 
and A. JOHN SIMMONS, ON THE EDGE OF ANARCHY: LOCKE, CONSENT, AND THE LIMITS OF 
SOCIETY (1993). 
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of externalities in the form of benefits that typically accompany the 
creation and upbringing of a responsible competent person who becomes 
a useful member of society.  The libertarian will insist that the receipt of 
such benefits does not generate any reciprocal obligations to benefit 
those who benefit us in these unconsented to ways—at least, not 
obligations that are legitimately enforceable and that justify forcible 
imposition on people’s liberty to lead their lives as they choose.  
However, bringing children into the world can, and often does, impose 
net costs on people who do not consent to bear these costs.  The 
introduction of one extra person may strain scarce resources.  A Lockean 
Proviso may be triggered, affecting everyone’s property rights.  Bringing 
a child into the world and failing to see to it that the child is properly 
socialized may be the moral equivalent of tossing into a crowd an 
inexpertly wired bomb that might, or might not, explode and injure one 
person, or many.  In these, and perhaps other ways, causing a child to 
exist might be violating the rights of others. 
Even if two individuals brought a child into existence in an isolated 
world in which no one would be affected in any way except the two 
parents and the child, the Lockean will surely hold that by bringing a 
child into the world one incurs obligations to that child to sustain its 
well-being and prepare it for adult life.2  It is not clear to me what a 
Lockean libertarian view entails concerning the shape and strength of the 
child’s rights to aid from its parents.  Whatever minimal acceptable 
threshold level of parental care is set by those rights, it would seem that 
such rights are legitimately enforceable.  For example, if one parent 
significantly violates obligations of care toward his child, it would be 
morally legitimate for the other parent to compel compliance. 
Given that an activity violates Lockean rights, it does not automatically 
follow that there is a legitimate regulatory role for the state to play.  
Perhaps Lockeanism rightly understood implies anarchism, so there are 
no legitimate functions for the state to fulfill.  However, if Lockeanism 
does allow that a minimal night watchman state could be morally 
legitimate, the legitimate functions that such a state would serve would 
 
 2. This formulation slides past a large issue: At what point in the development of 
a human child does the child acquire significant moral rights that include a right to care 
and nurturance from parents?  See F.M. KAMM, CREATION AND ABORTION: A STUDY IN 
MORAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1992) (offering a sophisticated broadly Lockean 
account of this issue).  I assume that at the very least, at some point in the development 
of a child, those responsible for bringing it into the world must either see to it that the 
child’s life is terminated or that some responsible adult persons agree to take on the full 
complement of rights and obligations identified with the parental social role.  It is not 
morally acceptable that a child should be brought into the world and simply left to 
languish without care. 
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surely include enforcement of children’s rights to adequate care from 
their parents. 
Activities that bring children into the world may violate the Lockean 
rights of nonconsenting other people by wrongfully bringing about a 
newborn person that has rights to a share of what used to be other 
people’s resources or by creating undue risk via neglectful parenting that 
the newborn child will eventually commit antisocial acts.  These 
possibilities aside, activities that bring children into the world may 
wrongfully threaten to establish a state of affairs in which a child’s right 
to care from its parents is not fulfilled.  These considerations provide 
grounds for legitimate Lockean restriction of family life.  So far as I can 
tell, these considerations are exhaustive.  In particular, a social scientific 
finding that restricting people’s legal opportunity to exit from marital 
arrangements would increase the expected well-being of the adults who 
enter these arrangements by contract would provide no reason at all for 
any state or private use of coercion to restrict people’s legal opportunity 
in this way.  Lockean adults are perfectly at liberty to enter into less than 
optimal or even self-destructive marital arrangements if they choose.  
Moreover, a social scientific finding that restricting adult individuals’ 
freedom to cohabit on whatever terms they find mutually agreeable 
would increase children’s average well-being appreciably (though no 
child would fail to get the minimal level of parental care to which she is 
strictly entitled according to Lockean rights theory if the restriction is 
not enforced) would provide no legitimate reason for enforcing such a 
restriction.  Rights are trumps, according to the Lockean. 
II.  PRIORITARIAN CONSEQUENTIALISM 
The considerations that the Lockean singles out as legitimately 
shaping correct conduct and just social policy seem to me to be 
undeniably morally relevant.  What is harder to swallow is the negative 
claim that nothing else legitimately shapes policy. 
This essay approaches the issue of state regulation of marriage from a 
standpoint opposed to the Lockean natural rights tradition.  This standpoint 
is a close cousin of utilitarianism.  The fundamental moral norm is that 
acts and policies should be selected to produce the best outcome, and 
outcomes are to be assessed in terms of the quality of human lives that 
people achieve.  This outcome assessment assigns greater value to achieving 
a well-being gain, or preventing a loss, for a person, the lower the 
person’s lifetime well-being would otherwise be, and the greater the size 
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of the well-being gain.  In other words, we ought to maximize weighted 
well-being (weighted by priority for the worse off).3 
What this prioritarian doctrine implies as to what actions we should 
choose and what social policies we should institute depends crucially on 
the nature of well-being—what constitutes it and what facilitates it.4  For 
purposes of the present discussion of appropriate state policy toward 
marriage arrangements, we need not enter deeply into an inquiry into the 
nature of human well-being.  So far as love, sex, and childrearing are 
concerned, my sense is that we, for the most part, agree about what is 
desirable and worthwhile.  The difficult questions revolve around the 
issue of what, if anything, the state can sensibly do to promote the good 
without thereby doing even more to promote the bad and the ugly. 
Regarding the values that are usually thought to be at stake in the 
regulation of family life, I hold what I take to be entirely conventional 
and banal views.  Pleasurable harmless sex acts between mutually 
consenting adults are good per se and inherently enhance the quality of 
the lives of the participating individuals.  These sexual acts are good qua 
pleasurable.  The acts have an imaginative and sensory content that is 
typically innocent (but can be morally problematic, for example, if one is 
sexually aroused by the thought of oneself beating up another person).  
These acts can exhibit a kind of athletic excellence, and be virtuous 
accomplishments.  They can be also be virtuous along another dimension 
if appropriately motivated, (for example, if one aims at mutually enhancing 
the pleasure of all co-participants).  The cooperating parties have a 
mutual friendly regard for one another and a mutual appreciation of the 
short-term common project in which they are engaged. 
Mutually pleasurable casual sex as described above is a significant 
human good.  Whether the sexual desire that motivates this activity is 
directed at a member of the human species of the opposite sex or of the 
same sex is morally inconsequential so far as I can see.5  If humans were 
psychologically capable only of sustaining casual sexual encounters, the 
 
 3. On prioritarianism, see Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority?, in THE IDEAL OF 
EQUALITY 81 (Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams eds., 2000). 
 4. On the nature of well-being, see JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, 
MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE (1986).  See also ROBERT M. ADAMS, Well-Being 
and Excellence, in FINITE AND INFINITE GOODS 83, 83 (1999); Richard Kraut, Desire and the 
Human Good, Address Before the 92d Cent. Div. Meeting of the Am. Phil. Ass’n (May 6, 
1994), in 68 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS’N, at 39–54 (Nov. 1994). 
 5. A sympathetic reconstruction of traditional arguments derogating homosexual 
sex appears in Paul J. Weithman, Natural Law, Morality, and Sexual Complementarity, 
in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON LAW AND NATURE 227, 227–28 (David M. 
Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997) (quoting John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and 
“Sexual Orientation”, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1066–67 (1994)).  Weithman 
criticizes the traditional arguments he reconstructs, and I find his criticisms compelling.  
Weithman does not endorse casual sex as intrinsically valuable as I do. 
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state as the agent of a decent society should seek to promote casual sex, 
both the frequency, and the quality, of such encounters.  A complication 
is that humans are typically capable of a greater good, the building and 
sustaining of long-term sexual partnerships in which mutual sexual 
sharing is combined with intimate friendship and cooperation in shared 
life projects, the complex relationship being cemented by assurances (or 
the confident mutual expectation) of mutual commitment and fidelity.  
Call this a committed sexual friendship (CSF).  Moreover, casual sex 
sometimes facilitates and sometimes obstructs CSF in a host of familiar 
and complex ways.  Casual sex is the usual experimental prelude to a 
CSF between two people, and in a wide variety of situations, having 
casual sex with a person will tend to trigger strong desires either to 
sustain a casual sexual relationship with that person or to develop a CSF 
with that person.  Casual sexual encounters thus become an arena in 
which deceit, fraud, exploitation, and wasted investment are common.  
Despite its intrinsic desirability, promiscuity justifiably has a bad 
reputation.  For many people in many situations, the pursuit of promiscuity 
tends to lead to the wrongful imposition of harms on one’s associates 
and to inhibit the development of an otherwise feasible CSF for self and 
others. 
At this point a legitimate state interest in the character of people’s 
romantic and sexual relationships becomes discernible, an interest that is 
distinct and separate from the interest in promoting childrearing 
practices that are conducive to increased lifelong well-being of the 
individuals formed by these practices.  The state should promote CSF, 
and seek to enhance the quality of people’s CSF relationships, on the 
ground that on the whole and on the average, people will be better off 
forming and sustaining such relationships than not doing so.6 
 
 6. I stand by the statement in the text, but complications abound.  For one thing, 
even if CSF tends to be a greater good than casual sex, there might be mixtures of CSF 
and promiscuity in a person’s life that involve more fulfillment for self and others than 
any feasible life plan for that individual involving CSF alone.  These mixtures might 
come about by way of the individual pursuing casual sex at one stage of life and CSF at 
another stage, or perhaps the individual might pursue a form of CSF that is tolerant 
of casual sex with persons other than the CSF partner(s).  Also, casual sex and CSF 
may be viewed as end points on a continuum, and individuals might pursue any of 
various midrange points rather than either extreme.  Moreover, there is a range of 
individual personalities varying in propensities to generate well-being for self and others 
when pursuing different romantic plans of life.  These issues are explored endlessly in 
soap operas, popular songs, and other popular culture manifestations; philosophical 
analysis may be otiose. 
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The prioritarian pursues this concern with a twist.  She assigns greater 
moral value to obtaining well-being gains for people, the worse off they 
would be without those gains.  Regarding romance and CSF, she gives 
extra weight, not to securing gains for those who are disadvantaged 
specifically with regard to those goods, but to those who are worse off in 
well-being prospects generally. 
Whether or not one accepts the prioritarian placement of a thumb on 
the scale in favor of the badly off, everyone should agree that the issue 
of how to treat conflicts of interest between those with poor life 
prospects and those with good life prospects has a large influence on 
people’s views on appropriate state policy.  Many policies that work just 
fine for competent choosers, who tend to fill the ranks of the better off, 
will work to the disadvantage of less competent choosers, who tend to be 
less well off overall.  A difficult issue of distributive fairness arises here, 
and reappears in many social policy choices. 
In principle, according to prioritarian doctrine, there is no limit to 
the sorts of considerations that could legitimately figure in the moral 
cost-benefit calculation that would determine morally right social policy 
concerning romance, sex, and childrearing.  Anything that affects people’s 
well-being now or in the future can tilt the scale.7  Without any justifying 
argument I shall just stipulate what I believe to be true.  Three considerations 
loom large in determining appropriate state policy in this domain.  Two 
have been mentioned: (1) the state has a legitimate interest in promoting 
good childrearing to boost people’s lifetime expected well-being, and 
(2) the state has a legitimate interest in promoting CSF to boost people’s 
lifetime expected well-being.  A third consideration is equality between 
men and women: (3) the state has a legitimate interest in promoting 
social arrangements that bring us closer to a world in which being born a 
woman is not per se disadvantageous, that is, a world in which the 
average well-being level of men and the average well-being level of 
women is roughly the same.8 
 
 7. Nancy L. Rosenblum considers the view that “appropriately ordered intimate 
relations reinforce democracy.”  Democratic Sex: Reynolds v. U.S., Sexual Relations, 
and Community, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY, supra note 5, at 63, 65.  The idea 
that we should inter alia regulate romantic life to improve the quality of democracy is 
doubly instrumental in prioritarian perspective.  Democratic political ideals are assessed 
for their instrumental contribution to priority-weighted well-being, and sexual regulation 
is then assessed according to its potential contribution to the degree to which appropriate 
democratic political ideals are satisfied.  Id. 
 8. A concern for equality of life prospects between men and women is valued by 
the prioritarian on instrumental grounds—equality is a means to achieving greater 
priority-weighted well-being.  For an indication as to how this argument might go, see 
JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1911) (1869).  
See also SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989).  In an 
interesting discussion of how social trends combine to weaken marriage and how we 
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III.  MARRIAGE 
The three desiderata just stated stand in no determinate relationship to 
the institution of marriage as we see it in the contemporary U.S. and 
other modern democratic societies.  Nothing hinted at so far in this essay 
demonstrates that we should assign primary responsibility for childrearing 
to the biological parents (the sources of the sperm and egg that unite to 
generate, eventually, a child), rather than to the community as a whole.  
Nothing said so far implies that it is desirable that people should seek 
CSF within the very same partnership arrangement that is dedicated to 
producing and rearing children (if we assume for the moment that people 
should be at least permitted to enter into partnership arrangements for 
the purpose of childrearing).  Normative discussion of these matters is 
plagued by a double risk—on the one hand of reiterating banalities, 
obvious truths everyone already knows, and on the other hand of asserting 
as true what are really demonstrably false claims that masquerade as 
obvious truths. 
To start the discussion, I shall simply describe what I suppose is a 
conventional understanding of marriage as it ought to be.  The remainder 
of this essay tentatively explores considerations that ought to shape 
public policy in this domain. 
The current institution of marriage serves several functions.  In the 
traditional marriage, a young man and woman fall in love and pledge to 
be sexually faithful to each other, live together, be intimate friends, pool 
financial assets, and cooperate as a team that develops and executes a 
common plan of life that is an important element in each individual’s 
separate life plan.  This common plan of life includes bearing and raising 
children together.  The mutual pledge that establishes a marriage is a 
lifelong vow, “for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness, 
and in health, . . . till death [do us part]. ”9  As the quoted words indicate, 
there is an insurance aspect to marriage.  Good and bad fortune is 
 
might reverse these trends, James Q. Wilson disparages Okin’s policy proposals—that 
we should strive to bring about equal sharing of income, childrearing, and housework 
between the husband and wife in every marriage.  Okin advances these proposals with a 
view to promoting equality of a sort between men and women; Wilson does not declare 
whether he accepts or rejects this broad goal.  See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE 
PROBLEM 187–90 (2002).  As noted later in this essay, the consequentialist of my stripe 
only contingently supports equality of any sort, and on some egalitarian views, a genuine 
commitment to equality requires a deeper commitment. 
 9. BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 292 (John E. Booty ed., Univ. of Va. Press 1976) 
(1559). 
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shared, and if one suffers disaster, the spouse is expected to lend a 
steady helping hand.  In infirmity and in old age, spouses assume 
caretaker roles.  To some extent, the insurance aspect of marriage extends 
across generations. 
What I have called the “traditional” model of marriage is roughly the 
main conception of it in twentieth-century America, lightly modified by 
concerns for equality between men and women.  The light modification 
is that role expectations for husband and wife are left unspecified.  The 
more traditional ideal of marriage would stipulate that the wife is to be 
homemaker and the husband the breadwinner, and would urge the wife 
to obey and the husband to command wisely.  Here the husband is 
understood to be male, the wife female. 
The traditional ideal of marriage receives some legal protection.  By 
law in most jurisdictions, marriage is between one man and one woman.  
Property that accrues to either spouse is jointly owned by the couple.  If a 
marriage lasts for several years, there is a presumption that both spouses 
have contributed to the income potential of the spouse with higher 
income, so there is income sharing required by law if the marriage 
dissolves.  The state also sets the terms of divorce, and in contemporary 
practice, this generally means that each marriage contract must contain 
an easy exit clause via the option of no-fault divorce.  Some states offer 
no-fault divorce but fault-based determination of terms of alimony.  
Except in states that now allow the option of the more restrictive 
covenant marriage, no person may sign a legally binding marriage 
contract that provides for no exit via divorce or includes clauses that 
render divorce difficult. 
The traditional ideal of marriage is sustained by social norms and by 
dominant trends in most people’s desires.  Even in the contemporary 
world, in which marriage and family life is buffeted by social forces, 
awareness of which is now widely shared, most of us grow up wanting 
and expecting to become married.  We hope that our marriages will be 
successful for a lifetime.  Though given the fact that about half of first 
marriages end in divorce, we probably marry now with a pair of fingers 
crossed behind our backs, and at least some residual dim appreciation of 
the reasonableness of providing in advance for what to do after a 
marriage crumbles.  Although there is greater social acceptance than in 
the past of living as an adult without marrying, and of living as a 
married adult without having and raising children, most people still 
want marriage, and a childless couple is an object of pity.  For that 
matter, most men probably hanker after the days in which the traditional 
division of marital roles between husband and wife was regarded as 
unproblematic, and some women have not freed themselves from similar 
hankerings. 
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Traditional marriage is a package deal, bundling together several 
distinct functions.  The question immediately arises, whether or not these 
various functions are better fulfilled by being bundled in this way than 
they would be if they were assigned separately.  Of course, to some 
extent legal and social marriage arrangements are a shell that can be 
molded to different shapes and filled with different content as times 
change and people’s needs with them.  The household economy of the 
family is no longer so important as it was, say, at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  Goods and services that used to be produced in the 
home are now purchased in the marketplace and brought to the home for 
consumption.  Still, marital substance is significantly determined by the 
form of marriage—what sorts of lives people will live within the 
institution or alongside it. 
The traditional marriage ideal presumes that the lover of your life will 
also be the person with whom you share childrearing joys and responsibilities 
if you have children.  Why this presumption?  The qualities that make one a 
good lover and intimate friend are not the same as the qualities that make 
one a good cooperative partner in the enterprise of childrearing, and it is 
commonplace that the two sets of qualities do not always coexist in the 
same person.  Imagine that Maria, a heterosexual woman, has a long-term 
exclusive sexual friendship with Igor, but lives with her long-term friend 
Frances.  The two women friends pool their finances and jointly share 
parenting responsibilities for the children they bear.  In effect, Maria is 
married, but the marital status roles are split across two persons.  Perhaps 
this arrangement is a bad idea, perhaps not.  One wonders why the state 
should put its stamp of approval behind one particular bundling of social 
roles, the ones constitutive of traditional marriage. 
In discussing alternatives to traditional marriage the discussion can 
easily veer off into irrelevant silliness.  Some forms of family life that 
might look attractive from some normative theoretical armchair 
perspective might be ways of living that no actual persons will ever 
come to desire, or desire strongly enough to make the way of living a 
socially recognized and viable option for people.  In the absence of 
tyrannical uses of state power that no sensible normative principles 
would condone, the imaginary alternatives are just that, imaginary 
alternatives.  The discussion of such alternatives is no more fruitful than 
reflections on what life would be like if humans had wings and could fly. 
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Recall that the topic of this essay is not what form of marriage is ideal, 
but rather what form of regulation of marriage-type arrangements ought 
to be enforced by the state in a decent society.  That is to say, given 
people and the background of institutions pretty much as they are, what 
regulation of marriage makes sense. 
Consider as a starting point what I will call the Lockean baseline option: 
The state should simply enforce whatever voluntary contracts individuals 
make with one another concerning romantic, sexual, family, and marital 
arrangements—provided these arrangements (1) do not wrongfully 
impose costs on unconsenting third parties, and (2) do not run afoul of 
the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring that every child has an adequate 
level of nurturance, education, and socialization.10 
One complication is what to do about risky contracts.  Suppose some 
types of romantic contracts individuals might be prone to make do not 
necessarily result in harm to children, but are associated with greater 
risks of unacceptable harms to children than other sorts of arrangements.11 
The prioritarian approach veers off from the Lockean regulatory regime 
for another reason already noted.  Suppose that romantic arrangements of 
types A and B both lead to outcomes for children above the Lockean 
baseline set by children’s rights.  Suppose further that the A type 
arrangements result in significantly better above-baseline outcomes for 
children and do not incur any other significant moral costs, compared to 
the B type arrangements.  Prioritarianism will then favor regulation 
by state policy that tends to induce people to opt for A rather than B 
(provided some feasible regulation passes a prioritarian cost-benefit 
assessment), but the Lockean prohibits any coercive restriction of 
people’s liberty with respect to their activities that violate no one’s 
rights.  The same opposition of principle emerges for the desiderata 
of promoting CSF and promoting equality in men’s and women’s life 
prospects.  But insofar as there is uncertainty, perhaps in-principle 
ineliminable uncertainty, in the normative and empirical measurement that 
enables us to judge what the weighted well-being consequences 
would be of adopting one or another marital regulatory regime, 
prioritarianism in practice might disagree with Lockeanism mainly in 
being more permissive: in allowing that any of several different and 
 
 10. Richard Posner endorses something in the neighborhood of this proposal in 
The Economic Approach to Homosexuality, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND THE FAMILY, supra 
note 5, at 173, 173–91.  See also RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992). 
 11. For discussion of the difficulties the Lockean libertarian theory encounters in 
determining how risks affect the interpretation of rights, see PETER RAILTON, Locke, 
Stock, and Peril: Natural Property Rights, Pollution, and Risk, in FACTS, VALUES, AND 
NORMS: ESSAYS TOWARD A MORALITY OF CONSEQUENCE 187, 187–225 (2003). 
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opposed regulatory regimes might be equally good, so far as we can 
know, from the standpoint of achieving best outcomes.12 
Two assumptions are stated below.  If accepted, they do not suffice to 
show that society should depart from enforcing the Lockean baseline all 
the way to giving legal privileges to traditional marriage.  However, they 
do suggest that the state ought to be fostering some cousin, or other close 
relative, of traditional marriage.  Exactly what type of regulatory regime 
might be best, is a question that remains open, for all that this essay 
argues or asserts. 
(1) On the whole and on the average,13 a child is better off if raised 
under the steady supervision of a small number (larger than one) of 
parent or guardian individuals who have primary direct responsibility for 
meeting the child’s needs and carry out this function without interruption 
until the child is full-grown. 
(2) On the whole and on the average, an adult is better off if he or she 
lives with at least one other adult who is both a long-term friend and a 
long-term sexual partner. 
Given 1 and 2, there is some reason for the state, acting as the agent of 
a decent society, to promote steady parenting and CSF cohabitation. This 
does not yet yield a rationale for promoting arrangements that combine 
these roles, but perhaps reasons are not far to seek.  Given that time is a 
scarce resource, if one is going to rear children and cohabit in a CSF 
relationship, it is convenient if both activities occur under the same roof 
with the same partners.  Moreover, the shared project of parenting is for 
many people an important and valued dimension of CSF.  Also, having a 
successful long-term friendship and sexual relationship with the same 
person(s) with whom one is carrying out a long-term childrearing project 
gives one extra incentive to stay the course and continue cooperatively 
participating in the parenting role.  Successfully cooperating in the 
childrearing endeavor could also induce one to persist in a CSF that was 
encountering troubles which would spell doom for the relationship were 
it not for the shared parenting.  Of course, in a culture that prizes and 
glorifies romantic fulfillment, when individuals are raising children and 
 
 12. An interesting attempt to show that a consequentialism that eschews interpersonal 
well-being comparisons implies roughly libertarian moral rules and social regulatory policy is 
made in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995). 
 13. This phrasing does not mean that each and every child is better off (averaging 
across time periods) when the stated condition holds, but rather that children on the 
average are better off if the stated condition holds.  One should read assumption (2) in an 
analogous fashion. 
ARNESON.DOC 8/7/2019  12:45 PM 
 
990 
engaged in a CSF together and the romance goes sour, there is pressure 
to split apart even if the parenting enterprise regarded separately is 
proceeding in a satisfactory way.  As such, the bundling of roles can 
foster instability of parenting partnerships. 
The bundling of roles in marriage as we currently understand it creates 
a certain oddity, though I think no real inconsistency, in current campaigns 
for legal recognition of same-sex marriage.  In our culture, society promotes 
and celebrates CSFs by assigning legal and social privilege to marriage.  
So, unsurprisingly, those of us who press for an end to discrimination 
and prejudice against same-sex sexual activity and same-sex CSF, 
campaign for same-sex marriage.  The legal recognition of same-sex 
messages expresses the correct idea that the important goods that are 
achieved in sexual activity, sexual friendship, and CSF are equally 
available in homosexual and in heterosexual relationships.  However, 
this concern is somewhat orthogonal to the concerns of people who think 
of marriage primarily as a device for facilitating healthy childrearing and 
for disciplining adult humans’ obsessive quest for romantic fulfillment 
in the service of healthy childrearing.  The point emerges clearly if one 
imagines that over the long haul, in a society that does not impose any 
stigma on homosexuality or discriminate against nonheterosexuals in 
any way, it turns out that lesbian couples choose to have children and 
engage in childrearing as often or more often than heterosexual couples 
do, whereas gay male couples virtually never do so.  In such a society, 
imagined to be free of sexual orientation prejudice, society might take 
various steps to promote CSF, but reserve certain legal constraints and 
privileges deemed constitutive of “marriage” and intended to enhance 
the quality of childrearing to lesbian and heterosexual couples which are 
presumed to be uniquely likely to be part of this enterprise. 
IV.  DONAGAN 
Consider in this context a suggestion advanced by Alan Donagan 
some years ago.14  Donagan was not proposing reform of marriage.  Nor 
was he engaged in utopian speculation as to how family life might be 
improved.  He was simply interpreting and defending the core morality 
of the Judeo-Christian tradition, which he found to be continuous with a 
certain strain of Kantianism.  Regarding sexual morality, Donagan proposed 
that it might be morally permissible for a number of adults to pledge to 
share family life together, to cohabit sexually on some mutually agreed 
terms, and jointly to share responsibility for any resulting children.15 
 
 14. ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY 100–08 (1977). 
 15. Id. at 103. 
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Donagan includes a further constraint that involves the pledge by 
group members that when bearing a child is a prospect, a woman will 
cohabit only with one man so that there will be a determinate father if a 
child issues from the woman’s sexual activity.16  Given that even apart 
from this further stipulation there would be multiple adults—fellow 
commune members—waiting in the wings who have pledged to assume 
fully the duties of parenthood, Donagan’s further constraint strikes me as 
otiose.17  At any rate, if it was deemed morally important that each child 
should know the identity of her biological father in this communal 
setting, DNA testing could establish this fact without any insistence on 
temporary bouts of monogamy for this purpose. 
It should be noted that Donagan limits his account of the morality of 
family life to the moral principles that should guide the relations of 
adults living together with a view to producing children.  A type of 
marriage regarded as the initiation of a family by and for mature adults, 
to promote their friendship, with procreation ruled out, lies beyond the 
scope of his discussion. 
Donagan has us imagine a group consisting of roughly equal numbers 
of males and females.  He tentatively concludes that such a commune 
could provide adequate assurance that children born to any group 
member will be properly nurtured, educated, and socialized, and 
concludes on this basis that such a form of family life might well be 
permissible. 
Why equal numbers of males and females?  Writing in 1977, Donagan 
did not have in mind the present day options that reproductive 
technology makes available, but even then adoption made it possible for 
a partnership that cannot procreate on its own to carry on the enterprise 
of childrearing.  So it is not clear that a viable reproductive group has to 
include any females at all, or any males, much less some specific ratio of 
males to females.  Extracommunal donated sperm, eggs, and childbearing 
services render a commune with any number of males or females 
including zero a viable childrearing enterprise.  His concern is clearly 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Donagan’s discussion is premised on the assumption that “a child’s upbringing 
is impaired unless the ultimate authorities in charge of it are its natural parents, joined in 
a stable marital union.”  Id. at 102.  I am not entirely sure how this premise is supposed 
by Donagan to be compatible with his tentative endorsement of commune style marriage 
as morally permissible, since in this form of marriage the communal members as a group 
assume joint and individual responsibility for the care and nurture of all children 
produced by group members. 
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not that the envisaged marital commune is ideally equipped for biological 
reproduction, but rather with the issue of polygyny and female 
subordination.  He mentions and endorses Saint Thomas Aquinas’ 
comment that in polygynist families the women will tend to become 
servants of the men.18 
Donagan is concerned with determining morally permissible forms of 
family life, whereas my topic is the proper role for state regulation of 
family arrangements.  Nevertheless, the two topics are closely linked.  If 
a communal arrangement among adults provides adequately for the care 
and upbringing of the children who issue from the arrangement, there 
should be a strong presumption that this is a valid form of marriage, and 
that the state should not seek to dissuade people from engaging in it by 
regulation.  In particular, there is no reason to extend legal privileges 
only to marriage arrangements that include just two adults rather than 
larger numbers of adults. 
Hillary Clinton has famously commented, “It takes a village to raise a 
child.”19  She has in mind that in order for the childrearing enterprise to 
have good prospects of success, the larger community beyond the family 
must provide support.  However, her comment could equally well be 
construed as an expression of doubt that in a modern setting, in which 
both members of a two-person marital partnership face pressure from 
social norms and the expectation of personal fulfillment to engage as 
long-term committed participants in the productive economy, merely 
two parents could be expected to manage the job with reasonable 
prospects of success.  Three, four, five, or more parents are needed—a 
village, not just a couple.  At least, there should be no legal discrimination 
against marriage contracts encompassing more than two adults even if 
few individuals are expected to avail themselves of this option. 
V.  POLYGYNY 
This last comment takes us back to the concern that certain forms of 
marriage, though they would not pose threats to the well-being of 
children, might nonetheless be inherently wrongful by posing risks of 
harm, bad subordination, or degradation, for their willing adult participants. 
A Lockean libertarian position would dismiss any such concern on the 
ground that no wrongful injury is done to one who voluntarily consents 
 
 18. Id. at 102 (citing 3 [PROVIDENCE] SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, ON THE TRUTH OF 
THE CATHOLIC FAITH: SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, pt.2, at 152 (Vernon J. Bourke trans., 
Hanover House 1956) (1261–64). 
 19.  HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE: AND OTHER LESSONS 
CHILDREN TEACH US 12 (1996) (quoting an old African proverb).   
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to interact with another adult, no matter how injurious the interaction 
proves to be.  All rights one has to be treated in any specified way are 
waivable and alienable by one’s voluntary consent.  One’s natural moral 
rights include this right of alienation and waiver, and the right is morally 
important.  Each individual has her own life to live, and the judgment as 
to how best to live it is hers.  Nonwaivable and inalienable rights would 
be a grievous affront to this expansive ideal of personal sovereignty. 
However, this ideal of personal sovereignty is too expansive.  We 
humans tend to be very imperfectly reasonable and rational guardians of 
our own best interests.  So even if one is striving to be reasonably 
prudent, one may fail, and fail in such a drastic way that duties of 
beneficence are triggered, so that another person who can stop one from 
stepping off the cliff may be morally required to give one a coercive 
helpful protective shove.  A bad marital choice can be the equivalent of 
inadvertently jumping off a cliff.  Suppose, however, that one is not 
ill-informed at all, but simply wants to make a ruin of one’s life, 
either by self-abnegating sacrifice of one’s own large interests to get 
small benefits for others, or just as a perverse expression of one’s 
autonomy.  Only a hard paternalism, which critics say has an acrid moral 
smell, would countenance forcible restriction of someone’s liberty to 
prevent her from self-harming conduct that results from fully informed 
and voluntary choice.20 
Here the metaphor of self-ownership seems to me to be helpful in charting 
the moral limits to personal sovereignty.  The idea of self-ownership is that 
each adult person should be regarded as having over herself the same full 
rights to use and abuse that a person who has full private property rights in an 
object has over that object.  However, private ownership rights are always 
limited by an element of stewardship.  As Locke says of the initial acquisition 
of unowned land, if one lets the property one acquires go to waste, one’s 
property right is eroded and at the limit, forfeited.  To carry through the 
metaphor of self-ownership, we should acknowledge that each person, the 
rightful owner of herself, has a duty of stewardship toward herself, a duty to 
make something worthwhile of her life for herself and for others.  Grievously 
vicious imprudent conduct voluntarily chosen violates this no waste 
requirement, and hence opens the individual to morally permitted restriction 
of her liberty against her will for her own good. 
 
 20. One deservedly influential critic who detects a moral taint in hard paternalism 
is Joel Feinberg.  See JOEL FEINBERG, Legal Paternalism, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE 
BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 110, 110–29 (1980). 
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Setting aside the Lockean libertarian doctrine as, in this context, too 
extreme, we are left with the harder issue, whether a sensible paternalism or 
some related moral position would endorse legal disfavoring of 
polygynous marriage.  A related moral principle might be a moral constraint 
against exploitation.  One might hold that morality forbids a person, 
contemplating interaction with another on terms that give the first person 
the lion’s share of the benefits, to profit in this exploitive way.  One 
might then hold that the law should follow the track of morality and 
stand against the interaction, not in order to prevent loss to the one who 
would get the short end of the stick in this arrangement, but to prevent 
the wrongful gains of the willing exploiter. 
Suppose that a society permits polygamous marriage and that a 
significant number of persons exercise this option by entering into one 
husband-many wives marriages.  Would the consequences of such a 
regime of legal polygamy be expectably bad, in a way that would 
warrant withdrawal of the legal permission?  I find the concern that leads 
Donagan to regard polygyny as impermissible to be important, and in 
principle this consideration could amount to a good reason for the 
prioritarian to demand a legal ban on such marriages.  What is much 
harder to discern is the likelihood that bad consequences would indeed 
ensue.  If polygyny is permitted, one might expect that males with 
greater than average wealth will make marriage offers that some women 
will find attractive.  The main expectable result might be that the pool of 
eligible women available for marriage shrinks for less wealthy males.  
So the historical motivation for banning polygyny might have been 
democratic patriarchy rather than any sort of concern for women’s 
equality. 
Other things being equal, one would expect that having more marital 
options increases the leverage of women in the implicit bargaining for 
terms of marriage contracts.  If wealthy males can offer second-wife and 
third-wife status to women who prefer this status to what they can obtain 
from men offering first-wife status, the end result might be closer to 
egalitarian sharing arrangements in monogamous marriages. 
At the level of sheer empirical speculation, one could just as plausibly 
describe a scenario in which polygamy is permitted and the main form of 
polygamy that develops is polygyny with socially powerful males 
wedded to several female mates, most of whom occupy a servile role.  
The consequence might be a cultural shift that leads all men to disfavor 
the ideal of companionate marriage and to favor the ideal of wife as 
servant.  The cultural shift puts antiegalitarian pressure on monogamous 
arrangements, so that on the whole and on the average, monogamous 
marriages become more patriarchal and hierarchical, with men dominant 
and women subservient. 
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VI.  NONWELFARIST IDEALS AND MARRIAGE NORMS 
My approach in this essay is to assess marriage practices and possible 
alterations of them by their consequences for the quality of human lives.  
Permitting polygamy is morally right if it is part of a package of policies 
that maximizes weighted well-being and wrong otherwise.  Proposed 
policies are more right or more wrong, depending on how far they diverge 
from what would produce the best outcome for people.  Such an 
approach is controversial in familiar ways.  In the context of assessing 
the meaning of marriage, a consequentialism of well-being might fail to 
register people’s belief that some modes of conduct are morally wrong, 
in and of themselves, whatever the consequences. 
The prioritarian’s relentless sifting to find the impact on human 
well-being might seem crass from some ideal-based perspectives.21  
Broadly, one might hold that there are impersonal values worth respect 
that are not reducible to the well-being of humans.  In this spirit one 
might hold that such strivings as the search for scientific understanding 
and the creation of ideal community in marriage are morally valuable for 
themselves, as worthy ends, quite apart from any contribution they might 
make to human well-being.22  The advocate of such nonwelfarist ideals 
might add that we misunderstand human well-being if we do not see it as 
properly subordinated to other moral goals.  In some cases one pays 
proper attention to the well-being of people by helping them gain the 
proper relationship and orientation to nonwelfarist goals.  Here gaining 
the good for people partly consists in assisting them successfully to 
pursue excellent goods that are not at all goods for people.  Some values 
are not for us; rather, we should be for them.  Some debates about the 
meaning of marriage center on such values, to which the welfarist 
consequentialist is blind. 
Another possibility is that the welfarist consequentialist is seeing 
through prevalent illusions.  I cannot in this essay attempt to address this 
large issue.  I simply note that the nature and depth of the disagreement 
between one who holds that some values are impersonal and do not 
reduce to well-being gains and losses, and one who denies the 
existence of such values depend on the consequentialist’s understanding 
of well-being.  If she believes that achieving scientific understanding 
 
 21. See Connie Rosati, What Is the “Meaning” of “Marriage”?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1003 (2005). 
 22. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 87–94, 108–143 (1998). 
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and achieving genuine friendship and love are themselves excellences, 
attaining which makes the attainer’s life better for her, then the 
consequentialist is not reducing human life to a calculus of happiness.  
The aspiration to live so as to create intrinsic goods and make these 
excellences accessible to many people, including future people, “makes 
human life more than just an exchange of costs and benefits, more than 
just a job or a trip to the mall.”23  In this last sentence I am quoting a 
Kantian who claims that unless we recognize values that we must live up 
to, and that do not bottom out in welfare for self and others, we end up 
with a shopping mall notion of human existence.  Not so, I say.  We 
consequentialists may be crass (and maybe being crass is correct, a form 
of being plain-spoken), but we aren’t crudely crass. 
VII.  DIVORCE 
An element of the meaning of any contemporary marriage is the 
likelihood of its collapse.  Roughly one-half of first marriages commencing 
in recent years down to the present in the U.S. are likely to end in 
divorce. The level of divorce has stabilized slightly below its peak level 
reached in 1980, but this tailing off of the divorce rate is not especially 
good news to fans of stable marriage, because it has been accompanied 
by a decreased tendency for people to engage in marriage rather than 
cohabit without formal ties.24 
Presumably there is an optimal level of divorce as well as an optimal 
distribution of marriages into those that endure and those that break 
apart.  The optimal level and distribution would ideally balance the 
interests of children, adult married partners, and affected other people.  
The prioritarian doctrine supplies a schema for determining a proper 
weighting of interests and hence a morally right determination of optimal 
level and distribution.  Presumably the optimal level and distribution of 
divorce are determined in tandem with the determination of the optimal 
level and distribution of undertakings of marriage commitments.  Some 
who get divorced should never have taken the vow, but surely not all; for 
some, marriage is a reasonable gamble that turns out badly.  The idea of 
the optimum here is the optimum that feasible alterations in state policy 
could achieve, though it is hard to get any clear idea as to what these 
 
 23. J. David Velleman, A Right of Self-Termination?, 109 ETHICS 606, 612 (1999).  
Velleman holds that a proper ethic sees the source of human dignity in rational nature, 
which demands our respect, and should not be regarded merely as one good for us or 
source of good for us, to be traded off against other goods and sources of well-being.  Id. 
at 609–12. 
 24. WILSON, supra note 8, at 197.  See also ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, 
DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE (rev. ed. 1992). 
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optima might be.  Social commentators bemoan the present state of 
marriage and divorce, but how do we tell whether we have too many 
divorces, too few, or just the right number?  For the moment, I consider 
just the aspect of the question that involves the joint best interests of the 
currently married partners contemplating dissolution. 
The ideal of romantic love is that a couple should stay intact just so 
long as mutual love endures between the romantic partners, so there is 
some presumption that if mutual love between husband and wife ceases, 
so should the marriage.  Even if mutual love endures, its persistence may 
not be enough to enable the couple to avoid inflicting unhappiness on 
each other that is remediable only by means of separation and divorce. 
These obvious considerations evidently do not, by themselves, amount 
to a case for easy divorce.  Individuals may tend systematically to 
underestimate their own vices that might be causing their marriage to be 
foundering, and to overstate the likely causal contribution of what they 
perceive to be their spouse’s vices toward marital discord.  Hence their 
belief that divorce will improve the quality of their lives may 
systematically tend to be illusory.  Making divorce difficult, rather than 
easy to obtain, may alter the incentives potentially divorcing people face 
in a way that encourages them to expend more energy on fixing their 
broken marriage instead of abandoning it, to their mutual benefit. 
At the level of abstract speculation, one might just as well surmise that 
people will systematically tend to stick with the devil they know, the 
unhappy marriage they are presently enduring, rather than risk the devil 
they don’t know, the uncertainties of life after divorce.  Or people may 
adhere too strenuously to misguided ideals of unconditional love and 
commitment—stand by your man, no matter what sort of undesirable 
he turns out to be.  The more prevalent these scenarios are, the more 
counterproductive it would be to erect new hurdles to divorce with an 
eye to discouraging people from taking this course. 
In other words, the prioritarian willingness in principle to endorse 
paternalistic restriction of marriage relationships for the good of the adult 
marital partners does not carry any direct implications for policy.  People 
can be foolish and imprudent, both by exiting too quickly from marriages 
that should endure, and from failing to exit quickly enough from 
marriages that should be terminated.  Simply providing multiple options 
of less restrictive and more restrictive forms of marriage—from marriage 
lite to nondissolvable union—is not a solution, because people may choose 
the wrong form that does not suit their particular propensities and traits. 
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There is also the possibility that prudent marital partners will find 
themselves with opposed interests concerning whether or not their 
marriage should end.  One partner may be better off if the marriage ends, 
the other partner worse off.  Making divorce difficult and costly favors 
those whose interests are aligned with the survival of their marriage; 
making divorce easy and cheap favors those whose interests are aligned 
with its termination. 
Here the issue of no-fault versus fault-based divorce and divorce 
settlement arises.  If one marriage partner is better off if the marriage 
continues and the other is better off if the marriage is dissolved, how one 
balances the interests of the opposed parties surely varies depending on 
whether or not one thinks one of the parties has been abusive or in other 
ways vicious in behavior toward the spouse.  Though even if one favors 
fault-based divorce settlements in principle, in practice one might 
suppose fault finding efforts by courts will not be sufficiently reliable 
and sensitive to sustain the integrity of the procedures.  However, even if 
it is assumed that fault-finding procedures will work badly, one might 
still favor them, on the ground that they might help foster a cultural shift 
toward greater social disapproval of those who fail to sustain marriage 
until death do us part.  But would such increased public censoriousness 
be a good thing or a bad thing on balance? 
VIII.  DISCOURAGING AND ENCOURAGING CHILDBIRTH 
A crucial factor in determining appropriate state policy toward family 
life is normative population policy.  Should we seek population increase 
or decrease?  At what rate?  Since potential parents in given circumstances 
are variously capable of raising children effectively, society will seek 
not simply population increase, decrease, or steady state, but will 
differentially favor reproduction by the more able or alternatively work 
to change the circumstances of those less able to boost their parenting 
prospects.  At some lower level of parenting ability, society actively 
should discourage individuals whose childrearing capacities are at that 
level or below from giving birth and raising their own children.25  If 
 
 25. This issue must be joined in state policy toward the disabled, especially the 
cognitively disabled.  See MARTHA A. FIELD AND VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT 
FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION: HAVING & RAISING CHILDREN (1999).  In the 
U.S. in the late twentieth century, the issue of parental incompetence lurks in policy 
discussions concerning single-parent families.  Here the unit of assessment is not each 
adult parent or guardian figure taken separately, but the fusion of adult caregivers in a 
single household.  See FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW F. CHERLIN, DIVIDED 
FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART (1991); KRISTIN LUKER, 
DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS: THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE PREGNANCY (1996); SUSAN E. 
MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES 
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there is no morally acceptable way to discourage childbirth, society 
needs mechanisms of separating incompetent parents from their children, 
either by encouraging adoption, or by installing children in orphanages 
or, less drastically, by channeling resources to children in ways that 
neither depend on the intelligent cooperation, nor reinforce the authority, 
of the incompetent parents.  These draconian-sounding types of policies 
are double-edged swords, which can harm more than they help, if poorly 
designed and operated.  However, a state that has administrative competence 
at its disposal has the responsibility to be a nanny state, and in some 
respects an aggressive nanny state.26 
IX.  DIFFERENCES 
Any regulatory regime for marriage faces the daunting task of balancing 
many sets of potentially conflicting interests—between children seeking 
nurturance and adults seeking adult fulfillment, between individuals with 
different romantic propensities who would benefit differentially under 
different types of regulatory regime, and between men and women.  How it 
is reasonable to cope with the last-mentioned conflict depends crucially 
on the extent to which men and women are different in traits and needs 
in ways that either cannot be eliminated, or should not be eliminated. 
 
(1997); SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: 
WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS (1994); Andrew J. Cherlin et al., Effects of Parental Divorce 
on Mental Health Throughout the Life Course, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 239 (1998); William A. 
Galston, Causes of Declining Well-Being Among U.S. Children, in SEX, PREFERENCE, 
AND FAMILY, supra note 5, at 290. 
 26. Prioritarianism as I understand it supposes that the choices we make do not 
affect the number of people who shall ever live.  Relaxing that simplifying assumption, 
we would need to determine the moral value of adding a child to the world, given a 
stipulation of the lifetime well-being that the child who might be added would attain.    
Prioritarianism by itself leaves this further evaluative issue wide open.  We might 
combine prioritarianism with a critical level doctrine, which asserts that the moral value 
of adding a child to the world is negative unless the expected lifetime well-being of the 
child exceeds a critical level that is somewhat above the level at which the child herself 
would reasonably regard her life as a matter of indifference to her, neither beneficial nor 
burdensome.  In this exercise one is assuming that the child does not affect the well-being 
of any other person.  When that assumption is relaxed, we need simultaneously to assess 
the moral value of adding a child of given lifetime expected well-being, taking into 
account the well-being gains and losses that accrue to other persons due to the existence 
of this child.  Only with these evaluations in hand is the prioritarian ready to tackle 
population policy issues.  On critical level doctrines, see Charles Blackorby et al., 
Intertemporal Population Ethics: Critical-Level Utilitarian Principles, 63 ECONOMETRICA 
1303 (1995).  See also Charles Blackorby et al., Birth-Date Dependent Population Ethics: 
Critical-Level Principles, 77 J. ECON. THEORY 260 (1997). 
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Many years ago the economist Victor Fuchs commented that “many 
different kinds of evidence suggest that on average women feel a 
stronger desire for children than men do and a greater concern for their 
welfare after they are born.”27  The evidence to which Fuchs alludes might 
be misleading or not; suppose it is not.  The differences between men 
and women that Fuchs cites might be for all practical purposes fixed or 
alterable; suppose they are fixed.28  There might be other significant 
differences as well—for example, a different propensity to violence.  
What then? 
If we seek equality of life prospects between men and women, in a 
world of difference, the task for social policy would be to arrange 
institutions and practices so that the differences between men and 
women do not work to the disadvantage of either group.  The aim would 
not be equal treatment of men and women but treatment that so far as is 
feasible given other moral goals, leads to equal life prospects on the 
average between men and women. 
Notice that the prioritarian’s commitment to such equality is shallow.  
Equality of any sort is desirable, for the prioritarian, only in so far as 
equality in the circumstances serves the goal of maximizing weighted 
well-being.  The prioritarian is a calculating feminist, not a committed 
feminist. 
X.  A TIME OF TRANSITION? 
In broad terms, one might regard contemporary advanced industrial 
democracies including Europe and the U.S. as undergoing a long 
transformation toward societies in which men and women participate 
equally, and on equal terms, in the labor market and in market 
entrepreneurial activity.  This transformation puts pressure on many 
institutions, notably, the family.  It is simply not yet clear what forms of 
romantic and marital practices will best suit such sexually egalitarian 
societies.  The marriage forms we have inherited limp along, and the 
ailments we now bemoan may prove temporary or may ultimately 
require prosthetic or more radical therapy.  Should traditional marriage 
give way to a regime of Lockean contract?  Should fluid cohabitation 
arrangements replace the traditional family arrangement, or should we 
 
 27. VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN’S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 4 (1988). 
 28. Fixed, that is, up to the discovery of a practical technology of genetic 
manipulation that allows for choice of traits; at that point, all bets are off. 
ARNESON.DOC 8/7/2019  12:45 PM 
[VOL. 42:  979, 2005]  The Meaning of Marriage 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1001 
engineer a new puritanism, if we can?29  Since we don’t yet have good 
answers to these and related questions, perhaps we should regulate with 
a light hand, letting a hundred flowers, and doubtless thousands of 































 29. Posner favors the former, Wilson the latter.  Note the prediction of Friedrich 
Engels, Karl Marx’s collaborator.  Engels surmised that as economic inequality between 
men and women diminishes and thus ceases to influence terms of romantic and marital 
arrangement, women will be more able to get what they want in the implicit and explicit 
bargaining that sets these terms, and will tend to insist on monogamy.  FRIEDRICH 
ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE 63–64 (1884). 
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